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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MASrrrc TILE DIVISION OF
THE RUBE,ROID COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 9957

A C l\1 E DISTRIBU;TING COM,PANY, a corporation, W. N. BEESLEY, SR., and SCOTT L. BEESLEY
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDE'N·T'S BRIEF
STA:TE.MEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was commenced December 14, 19'62:
(1) To determine that there was due and owing
from Acme Distributing Company to Respondent, the
sum of $82,270.49.
(2) To foreclose a Chattel Mortgage.
(3) To collect all accounts receivable assigned to
Respondent.
(4) For judgment for any deficiency remaining
against Acme Distributing Company for the full amount
of said deficiency and against the individual defendants
1
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for the amount of said deficiency, but not to exceed the
sum of $21,979.73.

DISPOSlTION IN LOWER COUR!r
The lowe·r court on June 10, 19·63, granted Summary
Judgment in Respondent's favor for amounts found then
due and owing, to-wit: $21,979.73 agarl.nst all Appellants
and $19,005.73 with interest in the -amount of $9·60.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,500.00 against Appellant, Acme Distributing Company.
RELIE·F SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that the judgment be reversed and
the matter tried on the merits.

2
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~TATEMENT

OF FACTS
Appellant, Acme Distributing Company, for some
years prior to the commencement of this law suit had
been a distributor of the floor tile and related products
of Respondent. Sometime during the first part of 1961,
the controlling stock of Acme Distributing Company was
transferred from W. N. Beesley, Jr., to his father, W.
N. Beesley, Sr., one of the Appellants herein. At that
time, Acme Distributing Company owed Respondent the
sum of $81,278.91 on open account, all of which was past
due. Acme Distributing Company desired to continue
its relationship with Respondent, but Respondent could
not pennit further extension of credit with such a large
past due balance. After discussion and negotiation
between the ·parties, certain documents were prepared
and executed on March 10, 1961.
The basic agreement between the parties reads :
AGREEMENT
"THIS AGRE:EMENT made and entered into by and
between .A:CME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, hereinafter called "Acme," and MASTIC
TILE DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a
New Jersey coropration, maintaining an office at 2340
East Artesia, Long Beach, California, hereafter called
"Mastic,"
WITNESSE1TH:
.WHEREAS, Acme is indebted to Mastic in the
amount of $81,278.91 and the same is past due, and
WHEREAS, Acme desires to continue as a distributor of products sold by Mastic and to obtain credit for
its further purchases from Mastic,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants herein set forth, it is agreed:
1. Acme agrees to execute and deliver to Mastic
its promissory note in ·the amount of $81,278.91 with
3·
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interest thereon at three (3%) per cent per annum, payable at the rate of $2,0.00.00 or more per month commencing on or before April 25, 1961, and· a like amount
on or before the 25th day of each month thereafter until
principal and interest aretfully paid.
2. To secure the payment of said promissory note,
Acme agrees:
(a) To execute and deliver to Mastic a chattel mortgage on aU merchandise heretofore sold to Acme by
Mastic and now held by Acme and on all merchandise
hereafter sold to Acme by Mastic or the Ruberoid Company or any of its divisions or subsidiaries..
(b) To sell, as.sign and transfer to Mastic all of its
accounts receivable now owned and all accounts receivable which it may hereafter awn which represent products
sold to it by Ruberoid Company, Mastic THe Division
of the Ruberoid Company and any other division or subsidiary of The Ruberoid Company.
3. Acme agrees to prepare and forward. to Mastic
on or before the lOth day of each month hereafter the
following schedules in manner and form .prescribed by
Mastic:
(a) A schedule of all accounts receivable representing business done by Acme during the preceding
month, together with a copy of each invoice or other
evidence of indebtednes'S, each document to bear an executed as.signment by Acme in manner and form pre,scribed by Mas.tic.
(b) A schedule of payments on accounts theretofore as,s1igned to Mast'ic by Acme received during the
preceding month.
4. From and after the 1st day of January, 1961,
all purchases from Mastic by Acme shall be at two
(2%) per cent discount if paid within sixty (60) days
from the invoice date and net if paid thereafter, provided
that all payments to Mastic shall be the net invoice
amount, and if paid within the discount period, Mastic
agrees to credit the discount to the unpaid balance of
the pvomissory note mentioned above, provided further
that all invoice·s ·shall be rpaid not later than seventy-five
(75) days from invoice date.
5. All books and records of Acme shall be open to
inspection by Mastic, their officers, agents or employees
4
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at all reasonable times, and Acme Agrees at its expense
to furnish to Mastic quarterly a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement attested to by a certified public accountant not later than thirty (30) days after each
quarter. Acme further agrees to furnish to Mastic a
copy of its Federal Income Tax return duly certified to
be such by the office of the District Director of Internal
Revenue.
6. Mastic agrees not to notify any obligor of Acme
of the assignment of its account provided Acme is not
in default in any payment herein reserved (note or open
account) or other covenant or condition of this agreement to be kept or performed by Acme.
7. It is agreed that all sales, rebates from Mastic to
which Acme may hereafter become entitled, except
merchandise returns and adjustments, shall be credited to
the promissory note mentioned above.
8. In the event of default by Acme in the payment
of any ins,tallment on said promis~sory note or on any
item of open account or any other covenant or condition
of this· agreement to be kept or performed by Acme,
· all indebtedness owing to the Ruberoid Company, Mastic Tile Division of the Ruberoid Company or any other
division or subsidiary of the Ruberoid Company shall
immediately be due and payable.
9. In the event of default by Acme, Mastic may
immediately proceed to collect the assigned accounts receivable of Acme and may as to each or any of such
accounts compromise and settle the same without liability to.Acme.
WITNESS the signatures of the Parties hereto this
lOth day of March, 1961.
ACME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC
By W. N Beesley, Sr.
MASTIC TILE DIVISION OF THE
RUBEROID COMPANY
By 0. A. Maggia

Secretary

·(Acknowledgements omitted)
The ·promissory note menti·oned m. the agreement
reads as follows:
5
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"PROMISSORY NOTE
$·81,278.91
Salt Lake City, Utah
March 10, 1961
FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt
whereo.f is acknowledged, the undemigned, jointly and
severally, promise to pay to the order of MA.IS'TIC TILE
DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a New
Jersey corporation, with its office at 2340 East Artesia,
Long Beach, California, the sum of EIGHTY ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT
DOLLARS AND NINgTY-ONE CENTS ($87,278.91),
with interest thereon at the rate of three (3%) per
cent per annum. 'This note is payable in installments as
follows: TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) or
more on or before the 25th day of April, 1961, and
TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) or more on
or before the 25th day of each month .thereafter until
principa'l and interest are fully paid.
In case of default in payment of any of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, it
shall be optional with the legal holder of this note to
declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable,
and proceedings may at once be instituted for the enforcement and collection of the same by ·Jaw. If this
note is placed with an attorney for collection or if suit
be instituted for collection, then in either event, the
undersi,gned agrees. to pay reasonable attorney's fees.
The makers and endovsers of this note severally
waive presentment for payment, demand, protest and
notice of nonpayment thereof and all defenses on the
ground of any enension of the time of payment that may
be given by the holder or holders to them or either of
them.
A:CME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC.
By W. N. Beesley, Sr
Its President"

'The chattel mortgage mentioned in the agreement is
part of the rooord (page 25) and will not be reproduced
herein to conserve space. The portion of this instrument
significant to this appeal is found on page 4 and reads:
6
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44

This chattel mortgage is given to secure the
paytnent of a promissory note in the amount of
$81,~78.91 made and executed by said mortgagor
and payable and delivered to mortgagee at its
office in Long Beaoh, California, together with
any further and additional loans or advances
which the tnortgagee or holder hereof, shall make
to the mortgagor."
"Mortgagor agrees to pay all costs and expenses in connection with the foreclosure hereof
whether by advertisement or action, including
reasonable attorney's fees."
Also executed on March 10, 1961, was a supplemental
agreement between the parties which reads :
"SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
THIS AGREE·MENT made and entered into by and
between ACME Distributing Company, a Utah corporation, herea£ter called "Acme" and MASTIC TILE DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, maintaining an office at 2340 East Artesia, Long Beach, California, hereafter calied "Mastic."
WITNESSE'TH :
1. This agreement is supplemental to that certain
agreement dated the loth day of March, 1961, between
the parties hereto ·and, except as modified herein, is in
full force and effect.
2. lt is agreed that so 'long as Acme shall not default in any payment reserved in said agreement of
March 10, 1961, (note or open acount) the amounts collected by Acme on its accounts receivable assigned to
Mastic, may be used by Acme in its ordinary course of
business for business purposes, but not otherwise. Payments to Acme on said assigned accounts shall be applied to the oldest item or charge on the account.
3. It is agreed that the first line of Paragraph 3
(a) of the agreement of March 10, 1961, is amended to
read as follows:
'(a) A schedule of all assigned accounts receivable,'.

7
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4. Mastic agrees that Acme may, in the ordinary
course of bursiness, sell those goods, wares and merchandi-se within the lien of the chattel mortgage mentioned
in the agreement of March 10, 1961, so long as Acme
is not in default in any payment reserved in said agreement or in any o1ther term or condition therein.
WITNESS the s.ignatures of the parties hereto
this lOth day of March, 1961.
ACME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC.
By W. N Beesley, Sr.
MASTIC TILE DIVISION OF T'HE
RUBEROID COMPANY
By 0. A. Maggia
Secretary"

(Acknowledgments omitted)
Appellants assert that this supplemental agreement
was omitted from the pleadings and record in this case.
It is readily seen that this supplemental agreement is
not material to the issues of this c.ase or this appeal, but
merely provides certain mechanics relating to the trade
accounts assigned and the merchandise covered by the
chattel mortgage.
As further consideration .and to induce Respondent
to grant further credit to Aeme ·and to continue the dealer
relationship, Appellant, Acme, by separate instrument
assigned to Respondent a debt in the amount of $21,979.73 whi·ch was owed to it by its former controlling
stockholder, W. N. Beesley, Jr. This debt had been assumed by the two individual Appellants. The assignment
reads as follows :
''A1SSIGNMENT
WHEREAS, there is due to Acme Distributing
Company, Inc. TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE DOLLARS AND SEV-

8
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ENTY THREE CENTS ($21,979.73) from W. N. Beesley, Jr,, a former officer of Acme Distributing Company,
Inc., which, for a valuable consideration, has heretofore
been as'sumed and guaranteed, jointly and severally, by
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Scott Low Beesley.
NOW, THEREFORE, for a valuable consideration,
receipt of which is acknowledged, Acme Distributing
Company, Inc., does hereby sell, assign and transfer
unto M.AJSTI'C TILE DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID
COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, the account or
claim against said W. N. Beesley, Jr. in the amount set
forth above.
It is agreed between Acme Distributing Company,
Inc. and Mastic Tile Division of the Ruberoid Company,
assignor and as,signee· respectively, that this assignment
shall be a part of that certain agreement between them
dated March 10, 1961.
Dated this lOth day of March, 1961.
kCME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC.
By W. N. Beesley, Sr.
Its President
MASTIC TILE DIVlSION OF THE
RUBEROID COMPANY
By 0. A. Maggia
Its Secretary
The undersigned acknowledge that they are jointly and severally liable to Acme Distributing Company,
Inc. in the amount of $21,979.73 and consent to the
foregoing Assignment.
DATED this lOth day of March, 1961.
W.N. Beesley, Sr.
Scott L. Beesley"

The intent of the parties is clearly shown by the
above agreements. Acme in snhstance said:
"We owe you over $81,000.00 which is p:ast
due, but we want to continue to do business with
you ·and obtain further credit. We are willing to
work out a security arrangement in order to continue business."
9
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Mastic answers in effect:
. "We will continue to do business with you
if you will give us a Note for the current balance,
se·cured by a mortgage on our merchandise and all
merchandise hereafter ·acquired from us. This
Mortgage ·is to secure this Note and also the further advances which we make to you by extending
credit. ·The Note is also to be secured by an assignment of your accounts receivable to the extent that they represent our merchandise soJd by
you to your customers. In addition, two of your
principal stockholders owe the company $21,979.73. We want that debt assigned to us as
se·curity for payment of any indebtedne·ss that
you may hereafter owe to us."
After the commencement of the law suit, all accounts
receivable that were collectable were colleeted and credit
given. The merchandise covered by the chattel mortgage
was returned to Respondent by agreement and credit
given for the full invoice price less freight. These credits
are as follows :
Accounts Receivable Credit. _________________$20,015.42
Merchandise Credit --------------------·----------- 20,487.50
'Thereupon, Respond~nt moved for Summary Judgment against all appellants. The two individual appellants moved for Summary Judgment in their favor. At
the hearing om the motions of the parties, the amount of
crerdit and the .amount due and owing was stipulated to
by counsel.
S.inc:e both parties were asking for Summary Judgment, each in effect is saying that there is no m·aterial
iss~e of fact and that one party or the other is entitled
10
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to judgment. The case then becomes simply a matter of
the proper construction of the written instruments of
the parties, which is a matter of law.
The liability of the appellant corportion is admitted
and the judgment against it is not subject to question.
The real issue is whether the two individual app€Uants
are liable to respondent :for the sum of $21,979.73. Basically, they contend that the assignment on the debt they
owe the corporation was for the purpose of securing the
notL' only. Respondent contends, that this assignment
was security for any indebtedness the company owed
Respondent. This was the construction placed upon the
instruments by the lower court and judgment was entered accordingly.
That thi~ is the only possible construction of the
agreements between the parties will be shown by the
argument set forth below.

11
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANT:ED BY THE LOWER COURT WAS CORREGT IN ALL RESPECTS.

Appellants under Point I in their Brief assert first
that the credit for merchandise returned was improperly
allocated between the Note and open account. They contend that the merchandise credit should have been ap-plied solely to the Note. This is simp~y a conclusion assurted by Appellants without reas'ons being given therefor. AppeUants do not state that there are facts which
will support their conclusion, nor do they point to any
agreement of the parties in support of this conclusion.
The Appellants have entirely overlooiked and ignored the clear and unequivocal terms of the agreements
between the parties. First of all, the agreement in its
preamble states,

"WHEREAS, Acme desires to continue as a
distributor of products sold by Mastic, and to obtain credit for its further purchases from Mastic."
The language quoted from the contract clearly demonstrates that the intent of the parties was to embrace a
continuation of their business relationship and the· further extension of credit.
The mortgage exe'Cuted by Acme Distributing Company states the following:
"'This Chattel mortgage is given to secure the
payment of a promis.s'ory note in the amount of
$81,278.91 made and exe~cuted by said mortgagor
and payable and delivered to mortgagee at its
12
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office in Long Beach, California, together with
any further and additional loans or advances
which the mortgagee or holder hereof shall make
to the mortgagor."
The mortgage is a standard, open-end mortl2'arr"' ;.1
common and general use throughout the financial world.
[t covers a situation where two parties contemplate a
continuity in business dealings and the further advance
of money or goods.
Clearly this mortgage covered not only the Note,
but the further advances made by Respondent to Appellant, Acme, represented by the open..:acccount purchases.
After the commencement of the law suit, the merchandise
was returned and a credit issued for the full invoice price,
less freight. This credit is not in dispute and is exactly
$20,487.50 (It is $163.36 higher than the sum mentioned
in Paragraph 7 of Respondent's Affidavit in Support
of Summary Judgment, but this figure was agreed upon
and stipulated to by counsel before the hearing.) (See
Judgment, Record 46.)
Since the mortgage covered both the Note and the
open account, this credit should be applied pro-rata as
set forth in the Affidavit of Respondent in support of
its motion for summary judgment.
In the Utah case of Farr v. Rartley, 81 P. 2d 640
(Utah), a series of Notes had been given, secured by a
single mortgage on real property. On foreclosure, the
question of the application of proceeds had arisen. The
court stated and held:

"·The only legal inference that can be made
13
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from the Finding o[ Fact is that the parties agreed
that there would be no priority of payment out
of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure.
Where such an agreement exists, whether express
or implied, a mortgagee is entitled to .share prorata with assignee note holders in the proceeds
of the property securing the notes where such
proceeds are insufficient to pay the entire amount
due."
The only difference in the case at bar and the Farr
case, supra, is that in the Farr case there were several
holders of the several obligations. The principle of law,
however, is the same. Where there are several obligations rurd the proceeds from the mortgaged property
are insufficient to pay all, they should he applied pro. .
rata.
There was due to Respondent on said N·ote the sum of
$47,250.00 and the sum of $35,020.69 on open account
when the law suit was commenced. These two items bear
a 42.3 per cent and 57.7 per cent ratio to the total. Applying this ratio to the $20,487.50 merchandise credit, there
is applied $11,821.29 to the Note and $8,666.21 to the
open account.
'This is a proper accounting of the merchandise credit
and the contention of Appellants that the entire credit
should he applied to the note is a direct contradiction to
the terms of the ~agreement and chattel mortgage.
Appellants assert that the assignment of the $21,979.'73 deht owed by the individual appellants was for
security purposes only and that no consideration was
given therefor. We are not enlightened, however, as to

14
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what facts or agreements appellants rely on to prove

their assertion.
Here again, the agreements of the parties clearly
Pxpressed show that the "contention" of appellants is
not legally sound.
First, as to the allegation of the two individual
appellants that the assignment was given without consideration. They can be eliminated from this phase
of the controversy because they cannot legally raise the
issue of want of consideration. In 6 Am. J ur. 2nd Assignments Sec. 90 it is stated:
"The defense that an assignment was made
without consideration is not one. which the origiJllal
debtor may raise when sued by the ass~gnee; the
assignee may generally recover in an action
·against the original debtor or obligor even though
there was no consideration for the transfer as
between the assignor and the assignee."
The individual appellants owe the corporation $21,979.73. They acilmowledge their indebtedness in the instrument of .assignment. There is no basis upon which
they can complain upon being compelled to pay a debt
which they admittedly owe nor can they complain rubout
being compelled to pay it to respondent.
The appellant corporation also "contends" that no
consideration was giv-en for the assignment. This contention is also baseless ·and entirely refuted by the agreements.
·The parties expressly made the assignment part of
the agreement of March 10, 1961 by reference. The consideration given therefor is the promise of respondent

15
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to grant further credit to Acme on its purchases. This
is clearly understood in the agreement. This promise is
sufficient consideration. In 10 Am. Jur., Pledge and
Collateral Securities, Section 10, it is stated:
"As in the case of contracts generally, the
general rule is that a pledge must be supported
by a· consideration. A sufficient consideration for
the pledge of property may consist of a present
loan, a further adva;ncement, a stipulation, express or implied, of further time in which to pay
a pre-existing deht or a change of securities of a
pre-existing debt." (Italics suppJied.)
Appellants attack the attorney's fees of $4,500.00
a warded by the court.
At the conclusion of the argument of counsel on
Respondent's motion for summary judgment, the court
instructed counsel to see if an agreement could he reached
on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. Respondent voluntarily reduced its claim for attorney's fees to
the sum of $4,500.00. This figure was incorporated in the
judgment to be entered by the court. Before the judgment
was entered by the court, it was submitted to counsel
for appellMts. The judgment c;ontains the following
statement:
"The above judgment is approved as to form
and amount of attorney's fees."
·This was interlined out by counsel for appellants,
and the folowing written in:
"Received a copy of the' foregoing proposed
judgment and submit the mattter of attorney's
fe-es to the court."
16
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It is true that Respondent claiined in its Affidavit
attorney's fees amounting in all to $8,200.00. This sum
is approximately 10 per cent of the sums due and owing
to 1\P~pondent at the time the law suit was commenced.
Since the mortgage not only covers the note but also
<·nn·r;:; further advances and provides that the mortgagor
shall pay attorney's fees upon foreclosure, the sum
originally claimed by Respondent is fair and reasonable.
However, when Respondent submitted the judgment
to the Court for entry, it voluntarily reduced this claim
to $4,500.00 and appeUan ts as quoted above submitted
the matter of fees to the court for its decision. This is
a reasonable fee for the collection of the note alone, without even considering the collection of the further advances (see Utah State Bar Advisory Handbook on Office lJlanagement and Fees, 1961).
Furthennore, appellants do not contend that the
fee is not reasonable. They merely say they do not know
how the same was assessed. Inasmuch as the fee is reasonable for the collection of the note alone, the assessment thereof is not material.
Appellants also alleged that by proper application
of the credits, the note might be paid and then no attorney's fees could be assessed. In order to make such an
assertion, appellants are looking through the wrong end
of the barrel. Appellants have announced a novel legal
theory for which there is no authority. In 143 ALR, Page
693, it is stated:
"Next to the nature and extent of the work
17
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performed, the most important single factor in
determining the amount of an attorney's compensation is the amount of money invo~ved or the
value of the proP'erty or rights in controversy."
·This principle is always viewed from the standpoint
of the amount in controversy at the time the law suit is
commenced and not after the security has been sold and
a deficiency determined. If it were otherwise as appellants contend, the attorney's fees stipulated in notes
secured by mortgages would he a nullity and would certainly work a result not intended by the contracting
parties.
Appellants have cited in their Brief certain Utah
cases where the summary judgment granted by the lower
court has been questioned. In each of those cases, the
motion was resisted and if the judgment were reversed
for trial, this court found that the showing made by the
prevailing· party in the lower court did not "preclude all
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which ·would reasonably substain a
judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret Dodge ·Trucking Center, Inc., 354 P. 2d 559 (Utah).
T'his case is distinguishab~e. Here Respondent
and the two individual appellants moved for judgment
based on their interpretation of the written instruments executed by the parties. The rule of Taylolf' v.
D~ahl, 353 P. 2d. 988 (Utah) applies. In that case, "All
parties mo:ved for summary judgment based on the pleadings and depositions of the parties. The court, thus,
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was invited to construe the alleged contract in light
of its terms and the depositions of the parties . . . The
trial court, therefore, at the request of .all parties was not
in error in construing the contract as not having been
performed by the seller, and in justifying the refusal of
the buyer to go ahead on the contract."
The position of the individual appellants is one of
inconsistency. In the trial court, they said in effect that
there is no material issue of fact and requested judgment
in their favor as a matter of law. When they lose, they
reverse their position in this court and state that there
is evidence which would support a judgment in their
favor and, therefore, the case should be tried on the
merits.
Since the individual appellants in the lower court
invited the court to construe the written instruments,
they should be bound to that position in this court. The
scope of inquiry on this appeal is whether the interpretation of the lower court is reasonably justified and not
whether appellants can produce evidence which might
support a judgment in their favor.

19
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POINT II.
THE PRO..RATED CREDIT :LS CORRECT, BUT DOES
NO,T EJFFEICT THE JUDGM.ENT OF THE COURT AND,
THEREFOR~, IS NOT PR:mJUDI ClA:t.. TO . APPELLAN'T'S.
1

~h~; two individual appeUants contend ~at the me·rchandise credit shoUld have ;been . applied only to the
note balance; that it would then be substantially paid
and that since the assignment 'was security for the note,
their individu3l •liability would· be considerably reduced.

Respondent.· pro-rated the merchandise credit, however, simply as a matter of correct accounting procedure, 'based on the term of the mortgage providing that
~he niei~chandise should he security for the note and
future advances.
T'he balance shown by pro-rating the credit are as
fqllciws: ·
Open-Account
Note Balance Balance
D~ate of hearing on
Summary Judgment ------------$~~,250.0.0. $34,238.38
Credit merchandise·. ·
__ _. . .
·returns_:.57. 7% ___ . :_ _______________ ~--- 11,821.29
8,666.21*
Credit accounts
receivable collected ---------------- 20,015.42
Total, less attorney's
fees and interest. _____________________$15,413.29
$25,572.17
Interest 12/1/6·2 to
790.00
June 10, 1963 ---------------------------170.00
Attorney's fees ---------------------------- 4,500.00
*(42.3%)
The assignment, however, was not merely security
for the payment of the note, but also security for other
indebtedness. This is the construction placed on the
20
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agreements by the lower court and reflected in the judgment of the court. Were it otherwise, judgment against
the two individual appellants would have been for the
sum of $20,283.29 instead of $21,279.73.
Appellants also contend that they had not received
eredit for the uncollected receivables and that this would
make a difference in their liability. Were it the case that
the accounts receivable had been given and accepted as
payment rather than as security, there would be merit in
appellants' contention. Further, Paragraph 9 of the
agreement of March 10 is a complete answer to the -argument of appellants. It reads :
"9. In the event 'Of defiault by Acme, Mastic
may immediately proceed to collect the assigned
accounts receivable of Acme and may as to each
a.n.d any of such accounts compromise and settle
the same without liability to Acme."
Since the accounts receivable were assigned only as
security and the power given to compromise and settle
the same, neither of the appellants have the right to
romplain about some of the accounts being uncollectruble
or compromised for a lesse·r amount.

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III.
THE ASSIGNED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL.APPELLANTS WAS ~SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT
OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS OWING TO RESPONDENT BY
ACME.

As stated above (and by appellants), the real controversey in this case is between Respondent and the two
individual Appellants centering upon the assignment.
Appellants first of all state that the assignment was for
security only. Respondent has never contended otherwise. Seeondly, appellants contend that the assignment
was security for the payment of the note only. This is
the point upon which the parties divide. The assignment
was, in f.act, security for the payment of any indebtedness owed by Acme to Respondent and the agreements
point to no other possible conclusion.
First, the assignment of" March io, 1961, pro~des
:that it shall be part of the agreement of March 10,·1961.
Nowhere in the agreement is it stated that the assignment is to be additional security for the payment of the
note. What is to be security for the payment of the note
is set forth quite clearly; a chattel mortgage on goods
and an .assignment of the trade accounts. Second, the
parties did specifically state that their business relation~hip would continue and that further credit w~uld be
given.
The only re,asonable inference from these agreements is that the assignment must co:ver future indebtedness. Such .a pJedge is legally valid. In She,ffer v. Griffiths, 245 P. 698 (Utah), this court states,
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"That pledges are to be construed and enforced according to the interest of the parties as
gathered from the instrument of pledge and the
subject m'atter thereof, and that by agreement
of the parties, the pledge may be applied, not only
to secure the payment or performance of a particular liability or obligation, but also in payment
or performance of all liabilities and obligatons of
the pledgor, due, ·or to become due, existing when
the pledge is given or thereafter contracted or
acquired."
One further point. The two individual appellants
owe the amount of the assigned debt to the corporation.
They so state in the written Assignment. The following
rule applies :
"As a general rule, the Assignee can reco<Ver
the same amount from the debtor as the Assignor
might have recovered if he had brought suit, and,
when the legal title is in the Assignee, he may recover the full amount of the obligation from the
debtor, although he holds the chose as security
for a debt or on trust for creditors." 6 C.J.S.
Assignments, Section 100.
If any rights or equity did exist as respects the
assignment, they would belong to the Assignor, Acme,
and not to the two individual debtors. Here again the
two individual appellants had no standing to complain
a;bout paying a debt they admittedly owe and since the
corporate appellant owes to Respondent a sum in excess
of the amount of the assignment, it ca.nnot complain about
the appli~tion of this debt to its indebtedness to Respondent.
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CONCLUSION
-On March 10, 19·61, Aeme owed to Respondent over
$80,000.00 which was past due. Respondent and Acme at
that time entered into an agreement providing that Acme
would execute a note for the past due amount secured
by a chattel mortgage and accounts receivable. In addi- tion, Acme assigned to Respondent a debt owing to it in
the amount of $21,979·.73 as security for the further extension of credit that would be granted to Acme as. contemplated by the agreement.
Further credit was extended and later Acme defaulted in its payments. Suit was commenced and the security
of the goods and accounts reeeivahle realized. upon.. Motions for summary judgment were made by Respondent
and the two individual Appellants. Sums owing and
~urns paid were stipulated to by counsel. A OOJ.ance remained that exceeded the as-signed debt.
Judgment was entered by the lower court against
Acme for the full balance, plus interest and attorney's
fees and against the individual appellants for the amount
of their de!bt to Acme and assigned to Respondent as
aforesaid.
On .appeal, the two individual appellants claim that
all credits must he appHed to the note and that they are
thereby suhstanially relieved of their liability because
the assignment was security for the note only. The agreements do not be!ar out the interpretation as:ked by the two
appellants and, on the contrary, the only reasona:ble interpretation of the agreements is that the assignment covered all deht owing by Acme.
24
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This correct interpretation was adopted by the lower
court a.nd the judgment of that court must therefore be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
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